much further happened, but in 2008 AIB Group negotiated with Barclays to allow it to have a second mortgage on the land to secure the loan of £3.3m to the borrowers. The borrowers subsequently defaulted on the loan repayments, and the land was sold. The housing market had declined and the house only fetched about £1.2m, and so after paying the outstanding debt to Barclays, roughly £300,000, AIB Group recovered only £900,000.
In the Court of Appeal 3 it was held that, because of the solicitors' failure to discharge the prior mortgage, the entire outlay by the solicitors of AIB Group's £3.3m was a breach of trust, on the basis that obtaining a valid discharge of the prior mortgage (or obtaining a solicitor's undertaking from the prior mortgagee's solicitors that the mortgage would be discharged upon receipt of the payment) was a condition for paying out any funds at all. This finding was not appealed. Applying general
principles of causation for loss as Lord Browne-Wilkinson did in Target Holdings v
Redferns, 4 the Supreme Court, in concurring judgments by Lords Toulson and Reed, held the solicitors liable only for the £300,000 the lender paid to clear Barclays' prior mortgage; even if there had been no breach and both prior mortgages had been cleared, the house would still have sold for only £1.2m because of the decline in the housing market, so AIB Group's loss owing to the breach on this 'but for' test of causation was only the £300,000 odd needed to discharge the outstanding mortgage.
Unfortunately, neither Lord Toulson nor Lord Reed made it clear what the scope of the decision was, that is, it is not clear whether a beneficiary is now barred in all
cases from falsifying the account so that the trustee's liability is to be determined on that basis, or whether only in certain cases. We shall consider this uncertainty in Part II.
But a better analysis, it is submitted, resolves the case without departing from traditional principles under which a beneficiary is prima facie entitled to falsify the 3 [2013] EWCA Civ 45. 4 [1996] AC 421.
trust account where the trustee, in breach of trust, misapplies trust property, in particular paying it away in contravention of the trust terms or his instructions where the trustee is acting under a mandate of agency. On the facts of the case, on the traditional analysis, AIB Group was entitled to falsify the account when the solicitors advanced the funds in the wrong amounts to Barclays and to the borrowers because each disbursement was a misapplication of the trust money, not being in accord with the instructions the solicitors were given. However, it is also clear that AIB Group, when informed of the situation, proceeded to accept the disbursements of money, and proceeded on its own to negotiate with Barclays ultimately to acquire
Barclays' consent to the second charge over the property in question to secure the full value of its loan to the borrowers. By pursuing off its own bat the second charge with Barclays, they proceeded on the basis that it was indeed their money that went to Barclays to pay off its prior mortgage; that is, they adopted the expenditure of the funds to Barclays as a disbursement on their behalf, and thus made it impossible for the solicitors to restore the account. If transferring the money to Barclays in this way was indeed an expenditure on behalf of AIB Group, there was no account to restore:
the trust funds must be taken to have been properly disbursed at which time the trust is no more. AIB Group's actions were entirely reasonable, given their understanding of the situation at the time. AIB Group's rationale for proceeding in this way can be inferred quite straightforwardly; they reasoned (as it turned out, wrongly) that there was sufficient value in the property to serve as security for the borrowers' entire indebtedness, as well as for the £270,000 odd owed to Barclays. If this is right, then AIB Group adopted, or accepted, the result following their negotiations with Barclays, i.e. that the borrowers' loan would be secured by way of a second mortgage inferior to Barclays' first mortgage . On this analysis the solicitors should not have been liable at all, for the expenditure, though in breach, was effectively adopted or ratified after the fact.
It is important to notice that the adoption of a misapplication of trust property can only occur after the fact, whereas a consent to a breach of trust arises before or at the time of the breach. 5 As Lord Millett said:
6
If the unauthorised investment has appreciated in value, then the beneficiary will be content with it. He is not obliged to falsify the account which the trustee renders; he can always accept it. … Where the beneficiary accepts the unauthorised investment, he is often said to affirm or adopt the transaction.
That is not wholly accurate. The beneficiary has a right to elect, but it is really a right to decide whether to complain or not. "There is no doubt that the disclosure required to avoid the consequences of a conflict is a full and frank disclosure of all material facts. The identification of the precise information which must be disclosed so that the fiduciary's principal is kept "fully informed of the real state of things" (Gray v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Ltd [1952] 3 DLR 1 at 14 per Lord Radcliffe) is likely to depend on the particular facts of the case before the court. It seems to me that the material facts in this case are the facts which give rise to the conflict …"
In that case his Honour noted that certain matters were, and others were not, necessary to be disclosed to obtain informed consent to the relevant conduct.
[161] It is also important to recognise that consent is not an absolute defence to a breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty. In Spellson v George [(1992) 26 NSWLR 666] at 669 Handley JA noted that the authorities establish that:
"consent is only a prima facie defence and that the Court must consider in detail "all the circumstances" in order to determine whether it would be "fair and equitable" for that beneficiary to be permitted to complain of that breach."
Applied to the facts of AIB Group it would appear that AIB Group was fully aware of all the circumstances when they began their negotiations with Barclays, and at no stage does it appear that they suggested that the solicitors should do anything further once AIB 'took charge' of the matter. Moreover, whilst early on the borrowers promised the solicitors that they would themselves would pay off the remaining amount on the prior Barclays mortgage, they never did so, and AIB seemed content with this when they pursued the matter with Barclays.
One final way of considering the matter is in terms of 'acquiescence'. In Holder v Holder 12 the plaintiff sued to set aside the purchase of trust property by his brother who had technically acquired the status of an executor, for breach of the 'selfdealing' rule. The plaintiff was held to have acquiesced in the sale although unaware at the time of the legal position. He had subsequently received part of the purchase price as a beneficiary under the will, and throughout had full knowledge of all the facts concerning the sale. Besides considering these facts that went to determining the plaintiff's acquiescence in the sale to his brother, the 'fair and equitable' requirement for allowing the beneficiary now to 'turn round and sue' was also applied, so it might be argued that more than acquiescence is necessary to bar a plaintiff from bringing a claim for relief. Even so, it must be just as much for an adoption case, where a beneficiary chooses not 'to complain' once in full possession of the fact, as AIB Group was when it set out to negotiate with Barclays, as for a consent case, that acquiescence should be seen as a factor weighing in favour of barring a later claim for breach of trust.
This analysis of AIB Group, subject to one point concerning whether AIB Group could falsify the account 'in part' -adopting the expenditure of the money to Barclays but falsifying the over-payment to the borrowers -which shall be discussed shortly, is fortified by the essentially identical analysis of the facts from the perspective of agency law. In a recent article, Peter Watts, criticising the decision of the Supreme Court, argues that the case turns primarily on the application of the principles concerning the ratification of an agent's unauthorised acts. put such speculation aside, since the common law does impose a duty on principals where fully informed, and it is simple enough to do so, to speak out or risk their silence being treated as a ratification of unauthorized action.
[W]hilst the solicitors in AIB Group were initially not forthcoming about their having accidentally released the money without a first mortgage being in place, they were soon driven to reveal the facts, and indeed some negotiations then directly occurred between their client and the existing mortgagee. In those circumstances, an inference of ratification was almost irresistible.
The only remaining question is whether AIB Group could have consented to the expenditure in part, say consenting to the payment of £1.23m to Barclays, but not to the £300k overpayment to the borrowers. On agency principles, Watts argues that the result in AIB Group can be justified on the basis that AIB Group's ratification of the transfer to Barclays need not encompass the overpayment to the borrowers. We shall return to that thought in a moment. On straight falsification principles, however, it would appear that AIB Group would have difficulty in making such a claim.
Where a trustee enters into two different unauthorised transactions, one of which causes a loss, but the other creates a gain for the trust, the beneficiary can, in principle, falsify only the loss-causing transaction, and adopt the successful one, if the transactions are distinct. 14 The trustee should not be exonerated of particular breaches because he can say, 'overall, the trust is in good shape'. However, where the losing and gaining unauthorised transactions form part of one composite transaction, the transactions must be falsified together or not at all. 15 For example, But, it is submitted, simply because the solicitors' actions exposed AIB Group to this loss, it does not follow that they are liable for it. Whilst there is no 'duty to mitigate' one's losses at common law, liability for damages both in contract and tort does not 17 '[F]alsify' here is placed in quotation marks as, strictly speaking, Bartlett was not a falsification case. The trustee in Bartlett was liable for not preventing the company in which the trust held shares from embarking on property developments. Thus the case was one of negligence, and the beneficiaries surcharged the account. But the principles of causation for loss in falsification cases were relevant because the transactions the company entered into were essentially ones that, had the company been the trustee, would have been misapplications of trust property, and so it was appropriate to analyse the facts in terms of falsification when assessing the loss to the trust. 18 Watts, supra n. 2, at 120, 121 (my italics in both passages).
extend to losses which could reasonably have been avoided. In this case, AIB Group could easily have avoided the £300k loss. It had an immediate claim against the borrowers: the borrowers held the excess they received on trust, this amount being misapplied when transferred to them, and were in addition personally liable for that amount as knowing recipients. AIB Group could easily have got an order against the borrowers to transfer the requisite amount to Barclays to discharge the remaining indebtedness to Barclays (at the borrowers' expense in costs) had the borrowers refused to do this themselves. On the facts, it is clear that AIB Group never concerned themselves with doing anything of the kind in keeping with the rationale for their actions following being informed of the solicitors' error, discussed above.
On orthodox common law liability principles, then, the result would appear to be no different than on orthodox falsification principles, i.e., that the solicitors ought not to have been liable for any amount.
II The Scope of the Ratio Decidendi in AIB Group
The reasoning of Lords Toulson and Reed in AIB Group is far from crystalline, but the following two passages seem to be their respective statements of the principle of liability that arises from the decision. [1] 140 years after the Judicature Act 1873, the stitching together of equity and the common law continues to cause problems at the seams.
The thought is that where a trust is a commercial one, both equity and the common law will have a role to play in analysing the facts, and any breach by the trustee, and thus common principles of liability ought to be found. But it is fair to say that there is no explicit statement by either of their Lordships qualifying the generality of the ratio, in particular narrowing it to trusts undertaken in 'commercial' circumstances, whatever they might be. 22 Henceforward, where a trustee misapplies trust property, a beneficiary of a trust will be disentitled from falsifying the account -the unauthorised expenditure will be regarded as an expenditure of the beneficiary's funds for the beneficiary's purposes. However, the trustee's breach in expending the funds on an unauthorised asset will, on the other hand, amount to a wrong sufficient to support a claim to surcharge the account, so that if the expenditure as wrongly made causally gives rise to a lower asset value than would have been obtained had the intended, authorised, asset been acquired, the trustee will be liable for the difference.
It is submitted that it cannot generally be the rule that a beneficiary is no longer It is worth point out first that the trust in Twinsectra was clearly a bare, commercial trust, identical in form to the trust in AIB Group itself, and yet the case proceeded on It will be found to be the result of all the best authorities on the subject, that, although a [trustee], acting strictly within the line of his duty, and exercising reasonable care and diligence, will not be responsible for the failure or depreciation of the fund. . .yet if that line of duty not be strictly pursued, and any part of the property be invested by such [trustee] in funds or upon securities not authorised, or be put within the control of persons who ought not to be instructed with it, and loss be thereby eventually sustained, such
[trustee] will be liable to make it good, however unexpected the result, however little likely to arise from the course adopted, and however free such conduct may have been from any improper motive.
Tom the trustee, in breach of trust, removes a gemstone from the trust collection held in a secure (ha!) vault in Hatton Garden in London, and sells it for £100,000. The gems, being in what is supposed to be secure safe-keeping, are uninsured. Later that week the secure vault is burgled, and all the gems are stolen. Tom must account for the £100,000 to the trust and cannot claim that had he complied with his duty all the gems, including the one he stole, would have been lost, so again, the claim that the beneficiaries undoubtedly have to the £100,000 cannot be founded as one for consequential loss. Rather, the beneficiaries in this case will elect not to falsify the account, but adopt the sale of the gem. This is the orthodox position, and it would seem that any claim by the trustee that he should not account for the funds because the beneficiaries suffered no conequential loss because of his breach (all the gems would have been lost in any case) would be rejected outright.
A similar set of facts presented itself in Akai Holdings (in liquidation)
. 27 The case Take another example, where a trustee 'borrows' trust moneys. In personal financial difficulty, a trustee in breach of trust sells the trust's 20,000 shares in XYZ plc at $5 per share, thus for $100,000, and uses the money to discharge his debts. Later on, when the market price of XYZ shares has fallen to $1 per share, the trustee restores the trust by spending $20,000 to purchase 20,000 shares in XYZ.
The trustee makes a handsome profit from his breach of trust, viz $80,000, and the beneficiaries have not suffered in any way from his breach, i.e. they are in the same position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. They therefore have no personal claim against the trustee under the aegis of surcharging the account, i.e making a claim for consequential loss. Only upon falsification/adoption principles does one get the right result: Upon the sale of the shares -in breach of trust -for $100,000, the beneficiaries can elect either to falsify the account or adopt the transaction. They will clearly adopt the sale. The trustee will be treated as holding the $100,000 on trust as a substitute asset acquired in exchange for the shares. The beneficiaries will then go on to falsify each and every expenditure by the trustee of that money which was used to discharge his own personal debts. They can thus make a claim against the trustee for $100,000 plus interest, and it is neither here nor there that had the trustee not committed the breach of trust the trust fund would have declined in value by 80%.
It might be suggested that the same result, holding the trustee personally liable for £80,000, could be achieved by applying the no profit rule 28 governing fiduciaries. In my view, the suggestion is misguided. In the first place, the rule is not apt in these circumstances. The no profit rule is directed to receipts by a fiduciary from third parties acquired in conflict of interest; it is not directed to a trustee's misappropriation of the trust assets themselves. Moreover, the rule has no application where the trustee in question is not a fiduciary, 29 for example in the case liability here but there is also no way that the trustee can replace the shares at a lower price if the share price has fallen. Again, if there was a general decline in the market, there is no way she can replace the money she paid herself discounted by the percentage decline in the trust fund. The 'no profit' rule has no application to this fact situation. It's falsification/adoption principles or nothing.
We can consider another example, posed by Watts. It is difficult to find a fault in this reasoning. Where a beneficiary/lender in such a case acts in time to withdraw its authority to lay out the funds, as a matter of principle it cannot be the case that the trustee can proceed anyway without authority, putting the risk of any loss on the beneficiary.
31 Watts, supra n. 2 at 125.
There is one further feature of understanding the beneficiaries' remedy for breach of trust as being a claim for consequential loss, which would lead to an expansion of the trustee's liability in certain cases. On orthodox principles concerning the trustee's liability to account, the only interest of the beneficiaries that the trustee's liability to account protects is their interest in the value of, or in the specific property in, the trust fund. It does not allow the beneficiaries any claim for consequential loss that they suffer which follows from the trust's being 'short of funds' owing to the breach.
Consider the following example: Because of the trustee's misapplication of the trust property, say making an unauthorised investment, Hazel, the income beneficiary, receives half the income in 2014 that she would have done if the authorised investment was retained. Let us also assume that Hazel can establish, on the standard 'but for' test of causation, that but for this reduction in her income she would have been able to make a profitable investment herself; instead, because of the reduced income, she could not afford it, and so can prove that the trustee's breach caused her a loss of profits. Has she any claim for this loss against the trustee?
Not by way of account. By falsifying the trust account her only claim is to have the trust restored, and this will include an amount of money to ensure that she receives the missing income for 2014, plus interest. But can she 'go outside the account' and claim her consequential loss on some broader notion of the trustee's breach of trust.
That would require founding a claim that would not be traditionally conceived of either as falsifying or surcharging the account, because the loss claimed is not a loss to the trust funds No such claim has ever been argued for in any decided case, although Jamie Glister has raised the possibility. 32 At first this might seem unjust, especially if our understanding of breach of trust is, by virtue of the kind of reasoning in AIB Group, shifted from principles of falsification and adoption to principles of compensation for 'but for' consequential losses. It is submitted that there is no injustice. Whilst a beneficiary is entitled to ensure that she receives all the distributions from the trust fund to which she is entitled, a trust fund which has all the property in it which it should (which rights the power to falsify and surcharge the account ensures), she should not be entitled to recover any losses she suffers in her own personal affairs because she relied upon receiving such and such a distribution on a timely basis.
The common law parallel in the law of torts is a wrongdoer's liability for consequential economic loss, or 'pure' economic loss as it is sometimes put. In general, tortfeasors are not liable to their victims for economic loss that does not directly follow from damage to the victim's person or to his tangible property. Why this is so, why a tortfeasor is not subjected to unlimited liability for all the economic losses his victim suffers that can be shown to flow from his wrong, is a controversial issue, but following Stevens 33 , the most satisfactory rationale for this position is this:
the law does not protect your liberty to exploit economic opportunities for profit. It example above. Which aspects of a beneficiary's financial wherewithal are supposed to be within the contemplation of the trustee? A trustee may have a duty to know something about the financial circumstances of different beneficiaries when exercising a discretion to invest the trust funds, 34 or in exercising a discretion to distribute property amongst a class of discretionary objects, but would this make it foreseeable that Hazel was unable, say, to borrow money to make the investment, the interest on which loan would be compensated more or less by the interest to which she would be entitled on the late distributions when they are later made to her? It is not clear what would justify placing this burden of investigation on the trustee. Moreover, it might be argued that a trustee should have no right, much less a duty, to know about any particular beneficiary's access to other funds.
Finally, there is a flip-side to this line of thinking. If a trustee is to be liable for consequential losses of this kind, should the trustee be relieved of liability if no consequential loss ensues? Consider this final example. Trudy the trustee has a duty to distribute the entirety of trust income to Ben the beneficiary which duty, however, is subject to a power to accumulate up to half the income which will accrue to capital, held on trust for his wife and children. Ben is a notorious wastrel.
Trudy, quite rightly, exercises her discretion to accumulate as much as she can with a view to distributing capital to his wife and children, when the former is released from Ben's affections by his death, and when the latter come of age. Trudy miscalculates. For the last 5 years she has accumulated 55% of the income, rather than 50%, such that Ben has received £250k less than he otherwise would have done. What if, during the period, Ben would, on the balance of probabilities, have lost the money gambling, or was a devoted collector of an artist whose work is junk?
On orthodox accounting principles, neither of these facts would give Trudy any relief from her liability to make good the failure to pay Ben. But on pure 'compensation for consequential loss' priniciples, it would appear that they might do just that. 
III Conclusion

